When Is Faulty Workmanship Excluded From A Builders’ Risk Policy?

One of the most difficult issues in construction law is the proper interpretation of an exclusion for faulty workmanship in a Builders’ Risk policy. The amounts in issue can be huge and if the exclusion applies, the absence of insurance can be serious.

Take for example the recent Alberta decision in Ledcor Construction Limited v Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Company. Window cleaners scratched the windows, which necessitated very expensive replacement of the windows. The trial judge held that the damage was covered by the Builders’ Risks insurance policy, and not excluded by the faulty workmanship exclusion. The Alberta Court of Appeal has just held that the damage was excluded by that exclusion.

This decision raises serious questions about the viability of Builders’ Risk insurance with respect to damage to another contractor’s work.

This decision is a very important one and will take some time to digest. On a first reading, however, some of the remarks and the basis of the decision raise some apparent conflicts with prior decisions and raise fundamental issues about Builders’ Risk Insurance.

Based upon this decision, contractors and subcontractors may want to obtain additional insurance to cover damage to each other’s work and property during the project. It appears that a Builders’ Risk policy may not cover that damage.

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Thomas  Heintzman  specializes  in  alternative  dispute  resolution.    He  has  acted  in  trials,  appeals  and  arbitrations  in  Ontario,  
Newfoundland,  Manitoba,  British  Columbia,  Nova  Scotia  and  New  Brunswick  and  has  made  numerous  appearances  before  the  
Supreme  Court  of  Canada.      
 
Mr.  Heintzman  practiced  with  McCarthy  Tétrault  LLP  for  over  40  years  with  an  emphasis  in  commercial  disputes  relating  to  
securities  law  and  shareholders’  rights,  government  contracts,  insurance,  broadcasting  and  telecommunications,  construction  
and  environmental  law.  He  was  an  elected  bencher  of  the  Law  Society  of  Canada  for  8  years  and  is  an  elected  Fellow  of  the  
American  College  of  Trial  Lawyers  and  of  the  International  Academy  of  Trial  Lawyers.  
 
Thomas  Heintzman  is  the  author  of  Heintzman  &  Goldsmith  on  Canadian  Building  Contracts,  5th  Edition  which  provides  an  
analysis  of  the  law  of  contracts  as  it  applies  to  building  contracts  in  Canada.      
 
When  is  Faulty  Workmanship  Excluded  From  A  Builders’  Risk  Policy?  
One  of  the  most  difficult  issues  in  construction  law  is  the  proper  interpretation  of  an  exclusion  
for  faulty  workmanship  in  a  Builders’  Risk  policy.  The  amounts  in  issue  can  be  huge  and  if  the  
exclusion  applies,  the  absence  of  insurance  can  be  serious.  
Take  for  example  the  recent  Alberta  decisions  in  Ledcor  Construction  Limited  v  Northbridge  Indemnity  
Insurance  Company.  Window  cleaners  were  hired  to  clean  the  windows  of  the  newly  constructed  
building  in  the  final  clean  up  of  the  site.  The  cleaners  scratched  the  windows,  which  necessitated  very  
expensive  replacement  of  the  windows.  The  trial  judge  held  that  the  damage  was  covered  by  the  
Builders’  Risks  insurance  policy,  and  not  excluded  by  the  faulty  workmanship  exclusion.  The  Alberta  
Court  of  Appeal  has  just  held  that  the  damage  was  excluded  by  that  exclusion.  This  decision  raises  
serious  questions  about  the  viability  of  Builders’  Risk  insurance  with  respect  to  damage  to  another  
contractor’s  work.  I  wrote  about  the  trial  decision  in  this  case  on  December  29,  2013.          
Background  
A   company   known   as   Station   Lands   retained   Ledcor  as   the   construction  manager   to  
coordinate  the   construction   of   the   EPCOR   Tower   in   Edmonton,   Alberta.   Station   Land   also  
contracted   with   various   trades   to   construct  the   building.   The   owner   obtained   an   All   Risk  
Builders’   insurance   policy   from   Northbridge.   The   policy   covered   all   “direct   physical   loss   or  
damage  except  as  hereinafter  provided”.  The  named  insureds  were  the  owner  and  Ledcor,  and  
the   additional   insureds  were   the   owners,   contractors,   sub-­‐contractors,   architects,   engineers,  
consultants,   and   all   individuals   or   firms   providing   services   or  materials   to   or   for   the   named  
insureds.  The  policy  was  a   “blanket”  policy,  designed   to  cover  all   actors  and  activities  on   the  
site.    
The  policy  contained  the  “faulty  workmanship”  exclusion  and  “resultant  damage”  exception  to  
that  exclusion  found  in  most  Builders’  Risk  policies.  Those  provisions  read  as  follows:  
“Exclusions…This  policy  section  does  not  insure:.  .  .  
(b)                The  cost  of  making  good  faulty  workmanship,  construction  materials  or  
design  unless  physical  damage  not  otherwise  excluded  by  this  policy  results,  in  
which  event  this  policy  shall  insure  such  resulting  damage.  (underlining  added)  
The   windows   were   supplied   and   installed   by   one   of   the   trade   contractors.   Station   Lands  
retained   another   contractor,   Bristol,   to   do   the   “construction   clean”   of   the   exterior   of   the  
building,  including  the  windows.    
Station   Lands’   contract   with   Bristol   was   in   a   standard   CAA   format   which   provided   that   the  
owner   would   maintain   “all   risks”   property   insurance   for   the   project   naming   the   owner   and  
construction   manager   as   insureds   and   the   consultants,   contractors   and   subcontractors   as  
additional  insureds.    
The  Court  of  Appeal’s  Decision  
The  Court  of  Appeal  went  through  the  following  logic  to  arrive  at  its  conclusion  
that  the  damage  to  the  windows  did  not  fall  within  the  policy:  
1. Cleaning  involves  workmanship  
The  court  rejected  the  respondents’  argument  that  cleaning  is  not  workmanship  
because   it   does   not   create   some   physical   product.   In   Bristol’s   contract,   work  
included   “services”   and   the   contract   refers   to   Bristol’s   “workmanship.”   In   the  
court’s  view  the  “construction  clean”  was  as  much  a  part  of  the  construction  of  
the  building   “as   the  designing  of   the   foundations,   the  hammering  of   the  nails,  
and  the  pouring  of  the  concrete.”  
2. Multiple  contractors  do  not  create  “resultant  damage”    
The   respondents   argued   “that   the   exclusion   does   not   apply   to   damage   caused   by   one  
contractor  to  the  work  of  another….  All  other  damage  it   is  argued,  particularly  damage  to  the  
work  of  other  contractors,  is  “resulting  damage”.  The  “cost  of  making  good”  only  relates  to  the  
making  good  by  any  contractor  of  its  own  work  product.”  
The  court  noted  that  “this  argument  contains  echoes  of  the  argument  that  what  Bristol  
Cleaning  was  doing  was  not  “workmanship”,  because  the  exterior  cleaning  involved  did  not  
create  any  physical  product  or  structure.”    The  court  rejected  this  argument  for  many  reasons.    
First,  it  held  that:  
 “it  is  artificial  (especially  in  the  context  of  an  all  risks  blanket  insurance  policy)  to  
try   to   draw   a   dividing   line   between   the   product   created   by   the   work   of   other  
contractors,  and  the  work   to  be  done  by  Bristol  Cleaning.  GC  2.4   requires  Bristol  
Cleaning  to  repair  any  damage   it  does  to  the  work  of  other  contractors.   In  effect  
Bristol   Cleaning’s   “Work”   included   replacing   the   damaged   glass,   even   if   it   was  
installed  by  another  trade  contractor.  To  say  that  the  exclusion  in  the  policy  only  
applies   to   a   trade   contractor   “making   good”   its   own   work   seeks   to   sever   that  
replacement  work.   The   “cleaning”  work   that  Bristol  Cleaning  was   required   to  do  
under   the   contract   is   said   to   be   of   a   different   character   than   the   “repair   of  
damage”  work  that  is  also  required  to  be  done  by  GC  2.4.  Yet  all  this  work  had  to  
be  done  before  Bristol  Cleaning  could  claim  substantial  completion.”  
Second,  the  court  noted  that  the  respondents  conceded  that  the  exclusion  is  not  limited  to  the  
cost  of   re-­‐doing   the   cleaning  and   that   there  must  be   some  “physical  damage”   caught  by   the  
exclusion.  But,  applying  their  theory,  they  could  not  point  to  any  physical  damage  excluded  in  a  
case  like  the  present  one.    
Third,   this   policy   was   a   “blanket”   wrap-­‐around   policy   covering   the   entire   project   and   all  
participants  in  the  project.  In  this  context,  it  was  the  court’s  the  view  “it  does  not  make  sense  
to  interpret  the  policy  such  that  the  damage  would  be  covered  by  the  insurance  if  the  work  was  
done  by  two  trade  contractors,  but  not  if  it  was  all  done  by  one  trade  contractor.  
Fourth,  this  policy  was  a  multi-­‐year  policy.  It  does  not  make  sense,  in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  
that  activities  occurring   later   in   the  project  would  be   covered  merely  because   they  damaged  
work  done  earlier  in  the  project.    In  its  words:  “Whether  something  is  the  “cost  of  making  good  
faulty   workmanship”   for   the   purposes   of   a   multi-­‐year   insurance   policy,   related   to   a   single  
construction  “Project”,   does   not   depend   on   the   exact   sequence   or   timing   of   the   various  
constituent  tasks  required  to  build  such  a  complex  building.”  
Fifth,  “the  scheme  of  the  insurance  policy  is  that  all  activities  on  the  site  are  to  be  covered  by  
one  policy.  There  is  nothing  in  the  policy  wording  to  suggest  that  coverage  varies  depending  on  
the  contractual  relationships  of  the  parties;  the  coverage  depends  on  the  type  of  “damage”.    
Sixth,   there  was  “nothing   in   the  wording  of   the  policy   to   support   the   respondents’  argument  
that   the   key   to   the   exclusion   is   the   identity   of   the   person   who   performed   the   work   that   is  
subsequently  damaged.”  
The  court’s  problem  with  the  respondents’  position  was  summed  up  in  the  following  paragraph:  
“The   respondents’   argument   leads   to   the   conclusion   that   coverage   under   the  
policy  depends  on  how  the  work  is  divided  up.  Under  the  respondents’  theory,  if  a  
single   contractor   is   retained   to   supply   the   glass,   install   the   glass,   and   do   the  
construction  cleanup,  the  scratches  on  the  windows  would  not  be  covered  by  the  
insurance.   However,   because   some   other   contractor   supplied   the   windows,   the  
very   same   damage   caused   by   Bristol   Cleaning   is   covered.   This   approach   might  
create  an   incentive  to  artificially  divide  up  the  work  as  finely  as  possible,  as  then  
the  maximum  amount   of   damage  would   be   covered   by   insurance.  On   the   other  
hand,  it  would  be  dangerous  for  the  owner  to  hire  a  single  contractor  to  do  all  the  
work,  as  then  nothing  would  be  covered.  That  cannot  have  been  the  expectation  
of   the   parties,   and   is   not   a   commercially   reasonable   outcome.   It   is,   as   noted,  
inconsistent   with   the   philosophy   behind   a   “wrap-­‐up”   policy   covering   all  
contractors.  
3. The  physical   or   systemic   connectedness  between   the  work   and  damage  underlies   the  
coverage  and  exclusion    
The  court  accepted  a  variant  of   the   insurer’s  approach   to  defining   the  ambit  of   the  coverage  
and   the   “faulty  workmanship”   exclusion.   In   doing   so   it   relied   upon   the   provision   in   Bristol’s  
contract  requiring  it  to  repair  damage  caused  by  it  to  the  work  of  other  contractors.  It  said:  
“If  the  workmanship  itself  directly  causes  the  damage,  then  both  re-­‐doing  the  work  
and  fixing  the  damage  from  the  first  attempt  easily  fall  into  the  expression  “making  
good   faulty  workmanship”.   This   test   identifies   a   class   of   physical   damage   that   is  
excluded   from   coverage   by   the   exclusion   clause,   while   recognizing   a   significant  
class  of  physical  damage  that  would  be  “resulting”  and  therefore  covered.  It  is  also  
consistent   with   GC   2.4,   which   requires   Bristol   Cleaning   to   repair   any   damage   it  
does   to   the  work  of  other  contractors.  While   that  covenant   is  expressly   found   in  
this   construction  agreement,   it   would   likely   be   implied   in   any   construction  
contract;   it   is  natural   that   if   a   contractor   causes  damage  while  doing   its  work,   it  
should   be   required   to   repair   that   damage   as   the   consequence   of   its   own   poor  
workmanship.   The   appellants’   interpretation   is   consistent   with   commercial  
expectations.”  (underlining  added)  
However,  the  court  slightly  altered  the  test  proposed  by  the  insurer  as  follows:  
“The  proper   test  can  more  properly  be  described  as  a   test  of   the  connectedness  
between   the  work,   the  damage  and   the  physical   object  or   system  being  worked  
on.   The   application   of   the   test   will   depend   on   an   examination   of   the   factual  
context,  but  the  primary  considerations  will  be:  
(a)                The  extent  or  degree  to  which  the  damage  was  to  a  portion  of  
the   project   actually   being   worked   on   at   the   time,   or   was   collateral  
damage  to  other  areas.  The  test  will  be  relatively  easy  to  apply  when  the  
damage  is  caused  directly  by  the  work  to  the  very  object  being  worked  
on.  There  may  be  cases  where  several  parts  of  the  project  work  together  
as  one  system.  Work  on  one  part  of   the  system  may  cause  damage  to  
another   part,   but   repairing   that   damage   might   still   properly   be  
characterized  as  the  cost  of  making  good  faulty  workmanship  if  there  is  
sufficient  systemic  connectedness;  
(b)                The  nature  of  the  work  being  done,  how  the  damage  related  to  
the   way   that   work   is   normally   done,   and   the   extent   to   which   the  
damage  is  a  natural  or  foreseeable  consequence  of  the  work  itself.  If  the  
damage   is   a   foreseeable   consequence   of   an   error   in   the   ordinary  
incidents   of   the   work,   then   it   presumptively   results   from   bad  
workmanship;  and  
(c)                Whether  the  damage  was  within  the  purview  of  normal  risks  of  
poor   workmanship,   or   whether   it   was   unexpected   and   fortuitous.”  
(underlining  added)  
The   court   concluded   this   analysis   by   saying   that   the   “degree   of   physical   or   systemic  
connectedness   is   the   key   to   determining   the   boundary   between   “making   good   faulty  
workmanship”  and  “resulting  damage”.  (underlining  added)  
Here,  the  court  said:  
“the  scraping  and  wiping  motions  that  caused  the  damage  were  the  actual  “Work”.  
The  damage  was  not  “accidental”  or  “fortuitous”.  The  scraping  and  wiping  forces  
that  caused  the  damage  were  intentionally  applied  to  the  windows,  as  a  core  part  
of   the  work   to   be   done.   Fixing   the   resulting   damage   is   “making   good   the   faulty  
workmanship”  that  caused  the  damage.”  
The  Court  of  Appeal   acknowledged   that   the   test   it  was  propounding  might   lead   to   “extreme  
results   in   extreme   cases”.   It   posed   the   situation   of   the   window   cleaner   using   a   flammable  
solvent   and   causing   the   building   to   burn   down.   It   acknowledged   that   such   a   loss   would  
normally   fall   within   the   policy   but   said   that   “[e]xtreme   cases   should   be   decided   when   they  
arise.  Whether  these  extreme  situations  call  for  a  separate  test,  or  are  merely  an  exception  to  
the  connectedness  test,  need  not  be  explored  in  this  decision.”  
The  Court  of  Appeal  concluded  its  analysis  with  this  over-­‐all  approach:  
“The  key   is  to  find  the  dividing   line  between  physical  damage  that   is  excluded  as  
“making   good   faulty   workmanship”,   and   physical   damage   that   is   “resulting  
damage”   which   is   covered   by   the   policy.   As   demonstrated   in   the   previous  
discussion,  the  wording  of  the  policy  and  the  weight  of  the  case  law  supports  the  
test   for   physical   or   systemic   connectedness.   The   exclusion   (considered   together  
with   the  exception)   excludes   from  coverage   the   cost  of   redoing   the  work.  But   it  
also  excludes  damage  connected  to  that  work,  such  as  any  damage  caused  to  the  
very  object  or  part  of  the  work  on  which  the  faulty  workmanship  is  being  applied.  
In   this   case,   the   cost   of   redoing   the   exterior   cleaning   of   the   EPCOR   Tower   is  
admittedly  excluded.  Also  excluded   is   the  damage   to   the  windows  being  worked  
on  at   the   time,  which  damage  was  directly  caused  by   the  cleaning  activities   that  
constituted  the  faulty  workmanship.  This  damage  was  not  only  foreseeable,  but  it  
was  highly  likely  (even  inevitable)  that  this  type  of  damage  would  result  if  the  work  
was   done   in   a   faulty  way.   That   type   of   damage   is   presumptively   not  within   the  
scope  of  the  insurance  policy;  the  policy  is  not  a  construction  warranty  agreement.  
“The  principle  just  stated  reflects  the  proper  interpretation  of  this  wording  of  the  
insurance  policy.   The   presumptive   test   is   that   damage   which   is   physically   or  
systemically  connected  to  the  very  work  being  carried  on  is  not  covered.  Whether  
coverage   is   nevertheless   extended   under   that   test   in   the   factual   context   of   any  
particular  case  will  depend  on  the  consideration  of  the  factors  listed  above  (supra,  
para.   50).   Those   factors   all   engage  elements  of   “causation”   and   “foreseeability”,  
concepts   which   are   well   known   in   the   common   law,   when   applying   the   policy  
wording  to  particular  factual  situations.  The  presumptive  test  stated  above  reflects  
the  proper  interpretation  of  the  policy,  but  these  collateral  factors  will  come  into  
play   in   applying   the   policy   wording   to   particular   factual   situations,   especially   in  
extreme  cases.”  
On  this  basis,  the  Court  of  Appeal  held  that  the  damage  to  the  windows  did  not  fall  within  the  
policy.    
4. Contra  Proferentem  did  not  help  
The  Court  of  Appeal  held  that  there  was  no  need  to  resort  to  this  rule  of  interpretation.  These  
provisions  of  the  Builders’  Risk  policy  had  been  interpreted  many  times  and  their  meaning  did  
not   become   ambiguous   just   because   the   circumstances   raised   difficult   questions   of   the  
application  of  the  policy  to  the  particular  facts.      
Discussion  
This   decision   is   a   very   important   one   and  will   take   some   time   to   digest.   On   a   first   reading,  
however,  some  of  the  remarks  and  the  basis  of  the  decision  raise  some  apparent  conflicts  with  
prior  decisions  and  raise  fundamental  issues  about  Builders’  Risk  insurance.  
1. The  Court  of  Appeal  relies  upon  the  provision  of  Bristol’s  contract,  requiring  it  to  repair  
the  work  of  others  which  Bristol  damages,  to  supports  the  court’s  “physical  or  systemic  
connectedness”   test.  Yet,   that  submission  appears   to  be  similar   to   the  one  which  was  
rejected  by   the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada   in   the  Commonwealth   Insurance  v.   Imperial  
Oil   decision.     There,   the   Supreme   Court   explained   that   the   contractor’s   obligation   to  
repair   work  might   well   require   it   to   perform  work   within   the   deductible   but   did   not  
disentitle   the   contractor   to  protection  under   the  policy.  As   the  Supreme  court   said  at  
paragraph  39  of  that  decision:  
“That   paragraph   [in   the   building   contract]   does   not   negate   the  
basic  proposition  that  everyone  involved  in  the  construction  of  the  
project  will  be  insured  under  a  policy  issued  to  all  as  a  group.  The  
reference   to   fault   occurs   because   this   policy   stipulates   a  
deductible   of   $10,000   and   because   it   contains   a   number   of  
exclusions,   e.g.,   error   in   design   and   latent   defect;   that   reference  
has  no  other  purpose.”  
2. The   Court   of   Appeal   makes   reference   to   the   insurance   contract   not   being   a  
“construction   warranty   agreement.”     That   submission   is   one   often   relied   upon   by  
insurers,   but  was   rejected   in   the  Progressive  Homes   v.   Lombard   Insurance   decision  of  
the   Supreme   Court   of   Canada,   where   the   court   said   that   the   proper   approach   is   to  
interpret  the  policy,  not  arrive  at  a  presumption  as  to  what  it  means  by  saying  that  it  will  
convert   the   policy   into   something   else.   At   paragraph   45   of   its   decision,   the   Supreme  
court  said:  
“Lombard   argues   that   interpreting   accident   to   include   defective  
workmanship  would  convert  CGL  policies  into  performance  bonds.  
In  my   opinion,   these   general   propositions   advanced   by   Lombard  
do  not  hold  upon  closer  examination.”    
3. The   Court   of   Appeal   equated   Bristol’s   work   (“the   scraping   and   wiping   motions   that  
caused   the   damage”)   with   intentional   harm   (“The   scraping   and   wiping   forces   that  
caused   the   damage  were   intentionally   applied   to   the  windows,   as   a   core   part   of   the  
work   to   be   done.”)   and   then   concluded   that   “fixing   the   resulting   damage   is   “making  
good   the   faulty  workmanship”   that   caused   the  damage.”     This   is   a   curious   conclusion  
because   it  does  not   seem  possible   that  Bristol   intended   to  damage   the  windows.  The  
damage  occurred  negligently,  but  fortuitously;  otherwise  the  policy  would  not  apply  at  
all.  As  the  Supreme  Court  said  in  Progressive  Homes  v.  Lombard;  
“Fortuity   is   built   into   the   definition   of   “accident”   itself   as   the  
insured   is   required   to   show   that   the   damage   was   “neither  
expected  nor   intended   from   the   standpoint  of   the   Insured”.   This  
definition   is   consistent   with   this   Court’s   core   understanding   of  
“accident”:  “an  unlooked-­‐for  mishap  or  an  untoward  event  which  
is   not   expected   or   designed”   ….When   an   event   is   unlooked   for,  
unexpected  or  not  intended  by  the  insured,  it  is  fortuitous.  This  is  
a   requirement  of   coverage;   therefore,   it   cannot  be   said   that   this  
offends  any  basic  assumption  of  insurance  law.  
4. The  basic  proposition  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  appears  to  be  that  a  Builders’  Risk  policy  
does  not  cover  damage  caused  by  one  contractor  to  the  work  of  another  contractor  on  
the  site.  One  must  ask:  where  does  the  policy  say  that?  Damage  by  one  contractor   to  
the  work  of  another  contractor  seems  such  a  foreseeable  event.   If  the  policy  does  not  
apply  to  that  damage,  should  the  policy  clearly  say  so?  And  is  this  proposition  consistent  
with  the  purpose  of  Builders’  Risk   insurance  as  described  by  the  Supreme  Court   in  the  
Commonwealth  v  Imperial  Oil  decision:  
“On   any   construction   site,   and   especially  when   the  building   being   erected   is   a  
complex  chemical  plant,   there   is  ever  present  the  possibility  of  damage  by  one  
tradesman  to  the  property  of  another  and  to  the  construction  as  a  whole.  Should  
this   possibility   become   reality,   the   question   of   negligence   in   the   absence   of  
complete  property  coverage  would  have  to  be  debated  in  court.  By  recognizing  
in  all   tradesmen  an   insurable   interest  based  on  that  very  real  possibility,  which  
itself  has  its  source  in  the  contractual  arrangements  opening  the  doors  of  the  job  
site   to   the   tradesmen,   the   courts   would   apply   to   the   construction   field   the  
principle   expressed   so   long   ago   in   the   area   of   bailment.   Thus   all   the   parties  
whose   joint   efforts   have   one   common   goal,   e.g.   ,the   completion   of   the  
construction,   would   be   spared   the   necessity   of   fighting   between   themselves  
should  an  accident  occur   involving   the  possible   responsibility  of  one  of   them.”  
(underlining  added)  
Based   upon   this   decision,   contractors   and   subcontractors   may   want   to   obtain   additional  
insurance   to   cover  damage   to   each  other’s  work   and  property  during   the  project.   It   appears  
that  a  Builders’  Risk  policy  may  not  cover  that  damage.          
See  Heintzman  and  Goldsmith  on  Canadian  Building  Contracts  (5th  ed.),  chapter  14,  paragraph  
3(b)(ii)  
Ledcor  Construction  Limited  v  Northbridge  Indemnity  Insurance  Company,  2015  ABCA  121  
Building  contracts  –   Insurance  –  Exclusion   for   faulty  workmanship  –  Exception   for   resultant  
damage  
Thomas  G.  Heintzman  O.C.,  Q.C.,  FCIArb                                                                    March  30,  2015  
www.heintzmanadr.com  
www.constructionlawcanada.com

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